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Summary: Appts, two i daho off1c1als, seek rever sa l

-

of th e Fifth Circuit's rulinq that Idaho's corporat e takeover

--

...

statute is unconstitutional, as it is preempted by the Williams

---~-----------Act and places an unjustified burden
on interstate comme rce.
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r
(1) that the suit against them in Texas federal

Appts argue:

'

.

court was barred under the Eleventh Amendment and principles of
federalism~

(2) that the Texas court's assertion of personal

jurisdiction over them violated due process, as interpreted in
International Shoe Co. v. ·washinqton, 326
that venue was improperly laid in

Texas~

u.s.

310

(1945)~

(3)

(4) that the Idaho

takeover statute does not contradict the purposes of the
Williams

Act~

and (5) that the Idaho statute does not place an

unacceptable burden on interstate commerce.
2.

Facts and Prior Decisions:

Appee is a nationally

-----------

traded, Delaware corporation whose central offices are in
Dallas, Texas.

In early 1977, appee proposed a tender offer for

~

two million common shares of the Sunshine Mining Company, a
~-----------------

nationally traded, Washington company whose principal mining
operation is located in Idaho.

Immediately upon making the

offer for the stock, appee's representatives filed a 13D
disclosure statement with the SEC, as required under the
Williams Act, 15

u.s.c.

§§78m(d)&(e).

At the same time, appee

filed an information statement with the Idaho authorities, as
required under the Idaho Corporation Takeover Law, Idaho Code
§§30-1501 to 1513; appee also contacted officials in New York
and Maryland concerning the possible application of those
states' laws concerning the proposed purchase of Sunshine
shares.
Four days after receiPt of the information statement,
appt McEldowney, the Director of Idaho's DePartment of Finance,
~

3.

(

ordered appee's tender offer delayed and telephoned officials of
appee in Texas to request more information concerning the nature
of the offer.

On March 28, 1977, appee filed the instant action

--

in federal district court in the Northern District of Texas,

---------

_.____-----.._,__

-~

-

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the

-----...__

--......__

-

enforcement of the Idaho takeover statute.
The Idaho Attorney
~
-- ~- ---......
--..._
General (appt Kidwell) and appt McEldowney were the named
defendants.

After an initial skirmish over a preliminary

injunction, the case was heard on May 23 and 24, 1977, and the
district court issued its 40 page opinion on September 2.
The district court first considered appee's standing to
object to Idaho's takeover statute.

Thus, the court noted that

in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U.S. 1 (1977), this

(

Court ruled that the Williams Act does not give rise to a
private cause of action for damages on behalf of a tender
offeror, as the Act was intended for the benefit only of
shareholders of target companies.

The district court concluded

that it nonethelesss was "free to hold that the Congressional
policy of even-handedness is probative of its intent to grant
standing to tender offerors and target management for
declaratory and injunctive relief under the Williams Act," as

I

this Court specifically reserved the question of relief other
than money damages in Piper.
Second, the district court ruled that any Eleventh

Amendment protection of the State of Idaho from suit in federal
court was not available to appts under

~parte

Youn~,

209 U.S.

4.

(

123 (1908).
Third, the court concluded that it had personal
jurisdiction over appts with respect to their enforcement of
Idaho's takeover statute.

As the Idaho statute prohibits appee

from making a tender offer in Texas until Idaho law has been
complied with, appts had minimum contacts with Texas under
International Shoe, supra.

The court indicated that its ruling

would not extend in general to any state statute whose
enforcement would have only a remote effect in other states.
The Idaho statute is a unique form of state regulation, as it is
intended to regulate commercial transactions occurring entirely
outside the borders of Idaho.

r

·.....___

Under such circumstances, it

comports with fundamental fairness for Texas courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction over Idaho officials charged with
enforcing
Fourth, the district court found that venue was
properly laid in the Northern District of Texas, as §27 of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 provides that venue for any
action brought to redress a violation of the Act may be brought
"in any district ... wherein any act or transaction constituting
the violation occurred ...• "

The court ruled that the violation

here occurred in Texas because that was where the statute was
being enforced.
On the merits, the district court ruled that the Idaho
takeover statute was unconstitutional under both the Supremacy

~and the Commerce
~
~---------------------Clause
Clause.
The court opined that the Idaho

s.
statute had been preempted by the Williams Act because it
conflicted the with basic purpose behind the federal act:

to

"balance the scales equally to protect the legitimate interests
of the corporation, management, and shareholders without unduly
impeding cash takeover bids."

Thus, the court noted that the

Idaho statute requires more detailed disclosure than does the
Williams Act, and that only the

Ida~o

act provides a waiting

period between disclosure and the consummation of the tender
offer.

These differences, the district court concluded, destroy

the delicate balance provided for under the Williams Act.
In addition, applying the criteria set forth in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397

u.s.

137 (1970), the district court

ruled that the Idaho statute places an improper burden on
interstate commerce.

The court found the purpose of the Idaho

statute to be the protection of incumbent management, a purpose
the court considered to be improper.

Moreover, the effect on

interstate commerce of the Idaho law is great, as it purports to
regulate all takeover transactions which affect Idaho business,
not just sales of shares by Idaho shareholders.

Accordingly,

the district court declared the Idaho statute to be
unconstitutional, and enjoined appts from enforcing the
statute's provisions.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in a 63 page
opinion.
~

Judge Wisdom, writing for the court, concurred in the

district court's ruling that Ex ·parte Younq does not require
that actions against state officers be brought in federal courts

6.
(

in the officers' home states.

More0v.e r, the appeals court

opined that the district court had personal iurisdiction over
appts, as they had acted directly to affect commercial
transactions in Texas, thereby establishing minimum contacts
with that state.

The court distinguished this Court's ruling in

Kulko v. Superior Court,

u.s.

, 98 s.ct. 1960 (1978), saying

that the effects in Texas of the Idaho statute's enforcement
against a Texas corporation were substantially greater and more
immediate than the effects in California of a father's consent
for his children to live with their mother.
As for venue, Judge Wisdom wrote that there were two
independent reasons why this action properly was brought in the
Northern District of Texas.

First, the court agreed with the

district court that §27 of the '34 Act laid venue in the place
where the violation occurred, and here the violation occurred in
Texas, the place where the Idaho Act was enforced against
appees.

Second, the court opined that the general federal venue

statute, 28 u.s.c. §1391(b) lays venue in Texas, as that was
where the claim arose.

~

On the merits, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the Idaho
takeover statute was unconstitutional under both the Supremacy
and Interstate Commerce Clauses.

Applying the standard this

Court laid down in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 u.s. 52, 67 (1940),
the court concluded that the Idaho law "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
.I

objectives of Congress," as expressed in the Williams Act.

In

7.

(

the court's view, the conflict between the two statutes lies in
their different approaches to the protection of investors:

The

~--

Williams Act is based on a "market approach," under which
accurate information is placed before the shareholders of the
target company and they are permitted to decide whether to
accept the offer;

The Idaho statute, on the other hand, is

based ona"fiduciary approach," as the primary emphasis is upon
~

-

placing before the directors of the target company the details
of the offer and allowing them to decide whether or not to
recommend that the stockholders accept the deal.
Like the district court, the court of appeals analyzed
the Commerce Clause challenge to the Idaho statute in light of
this Court's deicision in

Pike · v~

Bruce Church, Inc., supra.

Unlike the district court, however, Judge Wisdom found two
legitimate purposes that may underlie the Idaho law:

the

encouragement of responsible management, and protection of
investors.

Because the takeover statute has a severe impact

upon interstate commerce, the court nonetheless ruled that the
act "iolateo the Commerce Clause, as it was not carefully
tailored to promote these admittedly legitimate state interests.
Judge Godbold dissented with respect to personal
---------~

jurisdiction only; with~---------------------~---------respect to venue, sovereign immunity,

-----v-

subject matter jurisdiction, and the merits, Judge Godbold
agreed with the majority.

The dissent argued that none of the

traditional indices of personal jurisdiction are present here.
Appts did not avail themselves of the benefits and protections

B.
(

of Texas law. The minimum contacts between appts and Texas are
of the most attenuated kind:

the mere effect of the enforcement

of a state law on residents of another state.

Texas has no

particular interest in supplying a forum for actions of this
sort, which is neither tortious nor commercial.

Finally, the

dissent expressed concern that the majority's rule could not
fairly be limited to state takeover .statutes, but rather would
extend the federal courts' personal jurisdiction to any state
officer enforcing a statute with some effect upon a resident of
the forum.
3.

Contentions:

Appts make four contentions.

First,

they argue that Ex parte Young should not be extended to permit
suits against officers outside of the officers' states.

Appts

do not indicate that there is any conflict among the circuits
concerning this point.

Nonetheless, they contend that it is

contrary to the basic principles of federalism represented by
the Eleventh Amendment to permit such suits, and that the
anomaly of Ex parte Younq should be extended no further.
Second, appts argue that there was no personal
jurisdiction over them in Texas, as they had no minimum contacts
with Texas under International Shoe.

Appts disagree with the

Fifth Circuit's conclusion that this case is distinguishable
from the decision last Term in Kulko

v~

Superior Court.
"'-'

Moreover, appts argue that it was fundamentally unfair to
require them to travel to Texas to defend the propriety of their
enforcement of an Idaho statute.

Third, appts argue that venue was not properly laid in

/

Texas.

u.s.c.

Thus, they contend that, i£ the general provisions of 28
§1391(b) were construed to permit venue wherever the

effects of a state statute were felt, then venue could be laid
virtually anywhere in the United States.

Furthermore, appts

take issue with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the
enforcement of a statute arguably preempted by the Williams Act
constitutes a "violation" of the Securities Acts, as that term
is used in §27 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
Finally, appts argue that their takeover statute should
be found to be preempted by the Williams Act only if it would be
impossible to comply with both the federal and state acts at the
same time.

Furthermore, even under the more liberal

understanding of the Fifth Circuit concerning preemption, the
Idaho statute is unobjectionable because it does not conflict
with the purposes behind the Williams Act; indeed, it furthers
the primary purpose of protecting the investor in the target
company.

The explicit language of §28(a) of the Exchange Act

anticipates that states will be permitted to enact statutes such
as that challenged here, as it provides that, "nothing in this
chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities
commission ••. of any State over any security or any person
insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this
chapter."
As for the Commerce Clause challenge, appts contend
that the Idaho statute places no onerous burden on interstate

1 0.

commerce, and that the requests for . additional information made
by appts in this case were not unreasonable.
The States of California and Indiana have filed briefs
as amicus curiae in support of a?pts' jurisdictional statement.
In these briefs, the States urge the Court to give plenary
consideration to this case to resolve the scope of federal
courts' jurisdiction to entertain suits against officers of
states other than the forum state.
In its motion to affirm, appee tracks the analysis of
the Fifth Circuit.
4.

Discussion:

Appt's Ex · parte Young claim raises no

issue with respect to which there is a division among the
circuits, and there is no self-evident reason why the Eleventh L~<
Amendment would restrict officers suits to being brought in
federal courts within the state of the officer.

Although the

standing of a tender offeror to seek injunctive relief for
Williams Act violations is an open question, there is no
conflict, and appts only mention the point in their
jurisdictional statement.
substance here:

There are, therefore, three issues of ~

(1) the personal jurisdiction of the Texas

court over appts;

(2) venue; and (3) the constitutionality of

the Idaho statute.
(1) Personal Jurisdiction
There is no question that the Fifth Circuit applied the
proper standards in determining whether the district court

'-

_.,.._.

properly had exercised personal jurisdiction over appts.

International Shoe and its l?rogeny re.quire that a court look to
the fundamental fairness of the defendant being required to
~~ ~-·~--------~--~~~----~

------

appear i

a particular forum and defend an action.

--------·

--'-

~

This

fairness depends primarily upon the nexus between the action,
the forum, and the parties.

Moreover, it may be that

Circuit's decision fairly can be limite a- to ~pecif.ic___o_r-ders~
~. '---.--.
1ssued to out of state res1dents under particularly onerous and

--

-

-

-

extra-territorial statutes.

......___

---

the courts below is troubling.
-

·-

.>-....
~ . , ._

-

Nonetheless, the result obtained by
The spectre Judge Godbold poses

_.._

of state officials being called all over the country to defend
their state statutes that have some extra-territorial effect
see/ms a real danger under the Fifth Circuit's analysis here.
The question of the application of International Shoe to
officers suits outside the state whose statute is being
challenged independently is worthy of the Court's plenary
consideration, therefore.
(2) Venue
It is of course difficult to separate the question of
venue from that of personal jurisdiction, as the danger of suits

------------------------------

in far-off states can be taken care of by clever use of either
device.

Saying the claim here arose in Texas because the effect

of the enforcement of the Idaho statute was felt in Texas seems
tantamount to saying that venue could have been laid anywhere in
the country--a rather extreme result.

Moreover, it seems

questionable whether Idaho's enforcement of its statute fairly
could be characterized as a

11

Violation 11 of the securities acts.

1 2.

(3) Merits

'

.

The question of the constitutionality of state takeover
statutes is an important
literature.

on~

that has been discussed much in the

See, e.g., E. Aranow, Developments in Tender Offers

for Corporate

Cont~ol

(1977); Note, State Takeover St&tutes

Versus Congressional Intent:

Preempting the Maze, 5 Hofstra L.

Rev. 857 (1977); Note Commerce Clause Limitations Upon State
Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1133 (1974).

It

appears that the Fifth Circuit is the first to address the
question, and therefore there is r.o conflict.

Waiting for a

conflict to develop may be unwise here, however, as the issue is
of critical importance, and, as it now stands, Idaho is without
a takeover statute.

At the same time, the Court must consider

that, if it notes this case, the jurisdiction and venue problems
may preclude it from reaching the Williams Act or Commerce
Clause questions.
There is a response and two amicus briefs.

Jurisdiction

be noted.
12/18/78
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Re:

No. 78-759, Kidwell

v~

· Great · western United

Corp~

The various questions presented in this case may be
assembled as two broad issues:

the personal jurisdiction of

the DC over the appellants, and the validity of the Idaho
corporate takeover statute under the Commerce Clause, the
Supremacy Clause, and the federal securities laws, particularly
the Williams Act.

The CA upheld the jurisdiction of the DC,

and concluded that the Idaho law is repugnant to both the
Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause.

Part I of this

memorandum deals with the jurisdictional issue, which comprises
questions regarding Ex parte · Young, ·personal jurisdiction, and
venue in the Texas DC.

Part II of this memorandum deals with

the pre-emption question, concentrating on the relationship
between the Williams Act and the Idaho statute.
Both the Attorney General and the Director of the

2.

'

.

Department of Finance of the State of Idaho seek to appear as
appellants in this case.

But it is clear from the opinion of

the CA below that the Idaho Attorney General did not appeal to
that court from the decision of the DC.

Accordingly, he is

not ~

a proper party to this appeal.

I

Personal Jurisdiction over the · Appellants
The appellants, Idaho officials charged with the
enforcement of that State's corporate takeover statute, make
three arguments regarding the authority of the federal DC in
Texas to try this case.
A.

Ex · part~ · Yoang

The appellants contend that a suit against a state
official under Ex · parte · Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), can only be
maintained within the district where the state official resides
in his official capacity.

In support of this contention, the

appellants aver that every case in which the doctrine of Ex
parte · Young has been relied upon has been brought in the
district in which the defendant state official resided.

And

they cite two district court cases which they claim were
dismissed for want of personal jurisdiction because the
plaintiffs there sought to found jurisdiction over officials of
other States on Ex parte Young.

Turner

v~

~

· Baxley, 354 F.Supp.

3.

963 (D.Vt.

1972)~

Idaho · Potato · Comm•n · v; · washington · Potato

Comm'n, 410 F.Supp. 171

(D.Idaho 1976).

The appellee convincingly rebuts appellants arguments
on this point.

First, nothing in the theory of Ex · parte · Young

supports the limitation that appellants suggest.

------ ---

A state

official attempting
to enforce an unconstitutional law is
........________
~

stripped of the immunity enioyed by the State.
is treated as a private litigant.

Thereafter, he

If jurisdiction over him in

a federal DC in some other State is authorized by statute and
consistent with constitutional constraints, then he is obliged
to defend a suit brought against him in that district.
Appellee points out that

Turner · v~

Baxley, supra, turned on a

determination that the nonresident state officials lacked
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to support personal
jurisdiction, and that Idaho Potato · Comm'n

v~

Washington · Potato

Comm'n, supra, rested on a similar finding.
B.

Statutory and · Constitutiona! ·.Bases · for · Per§onal

Jurisdiction
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d) (7), service
of process to secure persqnal jurisdiction over an individual
defendant "is ••• sufficient if the summons and complaint are
served in the manner prescribed by any statute of the United
States or in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in
which the district court is held •••. "

The CA held that the

DC in Texas acquired jurisdiction over the appellants under

4.

~

T -e-;.., ~ ~-t.- ~~

v--

(rlA-

,2::zt>~

~ · (_ tj ~ ~ 5~/4(2-Ji'Z.7 ,y( 5Lf~
both the Texas long-arm statute and Section 27 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78aa.

The

appellants attack each of these bases for jurisdiction.
The appellants first contend that they did not fall
within the terms of the Texas long-arm statute.

They

acknowledge that the Texas courts have held repeatedly that the
reach of the statute is coextensive with the federal
constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction imposed by the
due process clause.
~'

See,

e~g~,

u~Anchor · Advertising, · Inc~

· v.

553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct.

1235 (1978).

But they insist that the statute is not intended

to reach defendants other than those who engage in commercial
activity in Texas.

Appellants base this argument on the

language of the section of the long-arm statute relied upon by
appellee and the lower courts, which subjects to service of
process" [a]ny ••. non-resident natural person that engages in
business in this State •.•• "

Because their only activity was

not business but governmental regulation, the appellants
contend, they did not fall within the terms of the statute.
The appellee briefly and convincingly refutes the
appellants' statutory argument.

II~

First, both the DC and the ~·

5 have agreed that the Texas statute extends its coverage to ~
the appellants.

There is little warrant for this Court to

disagree with their construction of Texas law.

Moreover,

~~

a ~~

careful reading of the Texas statute and related caselaw seems ~ dL/

~

5.

to indicate that the "doing business" terminology in the

-------------------...------------- - -

statute no longer has any particular commercial reference.
. . . . ._____ p---.....-.........-·--~-~'------~-........_----....__.----- --......._. -- ---.. . . .___ .----......_--------statute provides, in part

The

"For the purpose of this Act, and without including
other acts that may constitute doinq business, any
... non-resident natural person shall be deemed
doing business in this State by entering into
contract by mail ••• or the committing of any tort
in whole or in part in this State."
The commission of a tort is not commercial activity, yet is
defined by the statute to fall within the "doing business"
coverage of the law.

Thus, there is no particular reason to

look askance at the conclusion of the court's below that
appellants' activities also fall within the terms of the
statute.

And the Texas courts have indicated that the statute

is to be construed to obviate any question save the federal

-

constitutional inquiry as to the limits of due process.

u~

Anchor · Advertising;; · Inc~ v~ Burt, supra.

~~

The remaining question, then, is whether the

process clause allows a DC in Texas to exercise
over the appellants.

due ~

jurisdict ~

------

At a general level, the parties agree ·~~)?~

that this question is controlled by the principle announced in
International · Shoe · Co; v; - washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Jurisdiction is constitutional if the defendant had "such
contacts .•• with the state of the forum as make it
in the context of our federal system of government, to
the [defendant] to defend the particular suit which is brought
there."

~.,at

317.

The appellants argue that their

6.

'

.

contacts with Texas were inadequate to support jurisdiction.
They support this argument in two ways.
First, they cull phrases from some of this Court's
cases since International · Shoe.
statement in

Kulko · v~

They rely, for example, on the

· superior Court, 436

u.s.

84 (1978), that

the lower court's reliance on a defendant "having caused an
'effect' in [the forum state] was misplaced".

From this they

argue that it was error for the lower courts to refer to the
effect of the Idaho law and its enforcement on the activities
of the appellee in Texas.

Similarly, citing International · Shoe

and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), appellants argue
that they did not "exercise the privilege of conducting
activities in [Texas],

[or] enjoy the benefits and protections

of the laws of that state."

International Shoe, supra, at 319.

Second, the appellants develop a "slippery slope"
argument that if jurisdiction is sustained here, state
officials will be summoned all over the country to defend
against actions to enjoin their enforcement of all manner of
state laws.

As an example, they cite California officials who

enforce that State's air quality laws to automobiles coming
into the State.

The argue that under the decision of the lower

courts in the present case, California officials could be
forced to defend a constitutional challenge to their statute in
the Michigan courts, since by influencing the production
decisions of the automobile manufactureres there, their statute

7

.

'

has a "practical, extra-territorial effect" in Michigan.

As

other examples of state laws with extra-territorial effects,
the appellants cite domestic relations laws and corporate law.
I think that the appellants have misstated the
development of the law of personal jurisdiction in this Court's
decisions since International · Shoe.

Although the slippery

slope argument merits serious consideration, I think that it,
too, is probably inadequate to sustain the appellants'
position.
~

I{

The general fairness standard announced in
International Shoe cannot be reduced to a precise set of tests
or rules, and that has not been the Court's enterprise in the
cases since International Shoe.

Rather, the Court has taken a

number of cases to illustrate the application of the general
International Shoe standard to a variety of jurisdictional
problems.

In

McGee · v~

International · Life · Ins~

355 U.S.

eo~,

220 (1957), for example, the Court considered a situation in
which, unlike International Shoe, no employee of the defendant
conducted any activity inside the forum.

Rather, the only

contact of the defendant insurance company with the forum state
was the mailing of the policy into the state.

In

~

Shaffer · v~

Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Court explained the
application of Intenational · Shoe principles to in rem
jurisdiction.

And in

Kulko · v~

· superior · eourt, 436

u.s.

84

(9178), the Court considered the personal jurisdiction problems

0

B.

'

.

raised in a domestic law case.
The present case calls upon the Court once again to
demonstrate the International - Shoe analysis in a new context
that of a suit to enjoin a state official from enforcement of a
state statute that criminalizes activities conducted outside
the state.

f

Just as in the Court's previous cases in this area,

the factual context is so different from prior cases that

~

precedential guidance is available only at the level of general

~..,..~

pr1nc1ple.

~ some

That general principle is familiar enough -- has

purposeful activity on the part of the defendant created

some contact with the forum that is significant enough to make
it fair, within our federal system, to require the defendant to
defend the suit in the forum.
I think that this inquiry should be concluded in favor
of jurisdiction in the present case.

----

The Idaho statute

purports to restrict the right of the Texas corporation to
___ .-.....,_--..__

-~~---.....

.-

----

enter into transactions with shareholders of the target

-.

'-~ -~~-------------------------

corporation in Texas and every other State, as well as to

- ---------

--

regulate transactions within Idaho.

Pursuant to that statute,

the appellants sent an order to the appellee instructing it to
defer its tender offer because of noncompliance with Idaho's
statute.

Failure to comply with that order would have been a

violation of the Idaho law, subjecting the appellee's officers
and directors to indictment in Idaho and extradition from
Texas.

The application of the Idaho statute does not depend

~

9.

'

.

upon the residence within Idaho of any shareholders of the
target corporation, but only on the location there of the
incorporation, offices, or assets of the target corporation.
When a state passes a statute directly regulating activity
b~s,

~

on pain of criminal penalties for

noncompliance, I see no unfairness in requiring the officials

- - - · - ----------

.........____._

-----------

of that State to defend that law from suits for declaratory and
injunctive relief in the fora where the regulated activities
occur.
Nor do I think that this situation is difficult to
distinguish from the mine run of state laws that regulate
activity within the State itself.

To take the appellants'

example, the California air quality statute only regulates the
emissions of automobiles within California.

It does not

regulate or impose criminal sanctions on the manufacture, sale,
or use of automobiles outside the State of California.

I would

not think that a suit challenging such a law could be
maintained outside of California, and I also think that this
conclusion is consistent with sustaining the Texas DC's
personal jurisdiction over appellants in the present case.
Because the Texas long-arm statute supplies an
adequate statutory ground for the jurisdiction of the DC, I
will not analyze the arguments of the parties concerning
personal jurisdiction under Section 27 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
- ~

The principle issue presented in this

1 0.

'

.

regard is whether enforcement of a state law that is pre-empted
by the 1934 Act would constitute a "violation" of the 1934 Act
within the meaning of Section 27, the jurisdictional provision

--

of the 1934 Act.

My own view is that it would not.

Even if

the Idaho statute is pre-empted, the official actions taken to
enforce it do not violate any of the proscriptions contained in
the 1934 Act.

Rather, those actions are forbidden by the

Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
Before leaving Section 27, I would call to your

-----·- ---

attention also the suggestion in the appellee's Brief that in
federal question cases, the due process-minimum contacts
analysis is relevant to personal jurisdiction only if (i) that
jurisdiction rests on a state long-arm law incorporated into
federal law, and (ii) the state law is written or construed (as
a matter of state law) in terms of the federal due process
standard.

In the present case, for example, jurisdiction might

be based on the incorporation of the Texas long-arm statute by
Rule 4.

And since the Texas courts have construed the Texas

statute to extend jurisdiction ot the limits of due process,
the minimum contacts analysis that defines those limits is
relevant.

But it is relevant to the proper interpretation of

the state law, and not to a determination of the constitutional
limits on federal court jurisdiction.

Thus, appellees argue,

if jurisdiction rests instead on some federal statute (such as
§

27 of the 1934 Act, in the present case), then there is no

11

'

.

need for the minimum contacts analysis.

Personal jurisdiction

by any federal court is consistent with the Constitution.

As

the appellee puts it in its Brief, at 49, "Only the ·territorial
limits of the United States circumscribe

the validity of

federal process."
This theory, also suggested in footnote 1 of the SG's
Brief, is a throwback to the territorial-power theory of
jurisdiction embodied in

Pennoyer · v~

· Neff, and rejected by this

Court in the area of state court jurisdiction since
International Shoe.

I see no reason why the theory should be

retained in discussing the personal jurisdiction of federal
courts around the country.

Rather, I would think it proper to

apply the same test of minimum contacts with the forum, i.e.,
the district in which the federal court is held, to ascertain
the fairness of calling the defendant to defend the suit in
that place.
C.

Venue in the · DC in · Texas
The general venue statute applicable to the present

case is 28 U.S.C. §1391(b), which provides:
"A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded
solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought
only in the judicial district where all defendants
reside, or in which the claim arose, except as
otherwise provided by law."
In his treatise on federal practice, Professor Moore suggests
that venue should be proper under §1391 in any district in
which compulsory process against the defendant is available.

0

12.

The CA acknowledged the advantages that follow from such a
construction, but also recognized that there is considerable
support for the contrary position that a claim "arises" in only
one district for purposes of §1391.
The CA found no necessity to resolve this disputed
statutory construction, however, because it concluded that in
the present case, the claim "arose" in Texas.

There is some

precedential support for this position in the decisions of the
lower federal courts.

Moreover, in the context of an action

for declaratory and injunctive relief against a criminal
statute, this construction of the statute makes sense.

The

Idaho statute under which the appellants acted purports to
control the activities of the appellee in Texas.

The claim of

the appellee to be free of the Idaho statute thus sensibly may
~

be said to "arise" at the place where the appellee seeks to
perform the actions -- making the tender offer -- that
~

appellants purport to control by reason of the Idaho law.
II
Validity of · the · Idaho · statute
The CA found the Idaho statute invalid on both
Supremacy Clause and Commerce Clause grounds.

In view of the

direct and substantial burden imposed by the Idaho statute on
interstate commerce in securities, I think that th
invalidation of the state law.

Commerce
I also

think that pre-emption of the state law by the Williams Act is

1 3.

clear.
Compliance with the state law does not make compliance
with the Williams Act impossible.

But the Court has never

required a showing of such severe inconsistency between a state
and a federal law to support a conclusion that the state law is
pre-empted.

Rather, either "occupation of the field" by the

federal law, or a finding that the state "law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress", are sufficient to show
pre-emption.
(1978).

Ray · v; · Atlantic Richfield · Co., 435

u.s.

151, 158

It seems to me that under either of these two formulas

the Idaho statute is pre-empted.
The Williams Act is a comprehensive regulation of
tender offers for corporate control.

~~
~

It controls the actions

~

of both the offeror and the target company during the offer,
all with a view to protecting the interests of the shareholders
of the target company.

'---------------'-'
incorporation of state

It makes no provision for the
takeover statutes that impose additional

requirements on offerors and target companies.

Accordingly, I

think that one can conclude reasonably that Congress has
occupied this field of regulation, and that state regulation is

-----------~,----------------

ousted.

On the basis of a more detailed comparison of the
Williams Act and the Idaho statute, I also think that one must
conclude that the state law frustrates accomplishment of the

(/

14

'

0

.

congressional objectives underlying the Williams Act.

The

legislative history of that Act, as stated in the CA opinion
and the briefs of the appellee and the SEC, indicates that the
overriding purpose of the federal law is the protection of
investors.

From this proposition the appellants argue that the

state is doing nothing more in its law than
requirements that further protect investors.
protections are afforded

offers ~llowing
the

b~lowing

im~ing additiona~

--

-

These additional

down the pace of tender

target company management more time to review

offe~requiring

much more extensive disclosure by the

offeror regarding its financial and business condition, and
c2)interposing approval of the offer by the State's regulatory
commission.
The appellees and the SEC argue, however, that the
appellants have taken a one-sided view of the protections for
the shareholders that Congress incorporated into the Williams
Act.

The legislative history of that Act shows that Congress

was alert to the multiple interests of shareholders in the
tender offer context.

On the one hand, shareholders have an

interest in ha.ving available to them the information regarding
the offer and offeror that they need in order to make an
intelligent decision about the offer.

But equally important,

they have an interest in not having offerors discouraged, and
in not having unworkable and expensive burdens imposed on
tender offers.

9~!

Tender offers, as Congress recognized during

1 50

'

.

its lengthy deliberations on the proposals that eventually
became the Williams Act, are often of great value to the
shareholders of target companies; in a broader sense, the
potential availability of tender offers is valuable to
shareholders in almost all corporations as an incentive to
efficient management.
In balancing the need for disclosure against the
desire to avoid discouraging tender offers, Congress made
various decisions in structuring the requirements of the
Williams Act.

'h
That Act has no requirement for any filing Wlt

the SEC prior to the making of the offer.

w~

and the offer may be interrupted and delayed only by an
The required disclosures are limited.

The Idaho statute has a pre-offer filing and
disclosure requirement of the sort rejected by Congress.

It

also requires that commencement of the offer be delayed until
the state regulatory body has reviewed the terms of the offer,
held hearings, and approved the offer -- also a structure of
regulation rejected by Congress.

The practical upshot of the

-

Idaho statute (as well as other state takeover laws), as the
commentators have agreed, is to strengthen greatly the power of

tender offer and, in the meantime, to take action that will
result in the defeat of the takeover bid.

lA..--'

~M

There is no

requirement that the offer receive prior approval from the SEC,

injunction.

~
·

16 •

In its own regulation of tender offers, Congress
rejected such powers for the incumbent management of the target
company.

Accordingly, I think that the state's law must be

viewed as pre-empted by the Williams Act.
I should mention in closing that the appellants also
argue that a tender offeror has no standing under the Williams
Act to challenge the constitutionality of ' the state takeover
statute.

This argument is based on a misreading of Piper

v~

Chris · Craft · Industries, 430 U.S. 1 (1977), where the Court held
that an offeror does not have standing to sue for damages for
noncompliance with the Williams Act.

Here, the appellee is not

suing for injunctive relief or for damages for noncompliance
with the Williams Act.

Rather, its suit rests on a

constitutional claim under the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses
to be free of the requirements of the Idaho statute.
problem of "standing" here.

I see no
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Luther Munford, one of Justice Blackmun's clerks,
yesterday shared an interesting observation about this case
with me.

He pointed out that nowhere in the opinion of the CA

5 or in the Briefs of the parties here has there been any

discussion of the source of Great western United's riqht to
maintain this action in federal court -- that is, the

------

its "cause of action."

~urc~

of

Instead, attention has focused on the

question of personal jurisdiction.
Great Western's claim is that the Idaho statute
contravenes the Supremacy Clause because it is inconsistent
with the Williams Act.
opinion in ehapman, 42

Given the position expressed in our

u.s.c.

for Great Western's suit.

-

§1983 does not provide a basis

We arque 1n ehapman that "laws" in

§1983 includes only civil rights laws, among which the Williams

2.

.

'

Act does not number.

And it would undercut this limitation on

"laws" completely if the term "Constitution" in the statute
were construed to include Supremacy Clause claims.

On this

latter point, I refer you to Justice Stevens' discussion in his
opinion in ehapman of the comparable situation with respect to
28

u.s.c.

§1343

(copy attached).

An alternative source for Great Western's cause of
action is the Williams Act itself.

But there is only a tenuous

basis for supposing that the Williams Act creates a statutory
right to be free of conflicting state laws, and even less
support for the conclusion that it authorizes private suits in
federal court to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief from
such state laws.

The argument on the former point rests on

Section 28 of the 1934 Act, 15

u.s.c.

§

78bb, which provides

that:
"Nothing in this chapter shall affect the
jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any
agency or officer performing like functions) of any
State over any security or any person insofar as it
does not conflict with the provisions of this
chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder."
Great Western might argue that by implication, Section 28
prohibits state laws in conflict with the federal securities
laws.

If this is so, Great Western might continue, then the

enforcement of such laws against it would violate Section 28,
and Section 27 creates the cause of action Great Western
asserts.
Section 27, 15

u.s.c.

§§78aa, provides 1n part:

3.

"Any suit or action to enforce any liability or
duty created by this chapter or rules and
regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation
of such chapter or rules and regulation, may be
brought in any such district [where the violation
occurred] or in the district wherein the defendant
is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business

"
Its own suit, Great Western would urge, seeks to enjoin a
violation of Section 28, so it is authorized by Section 27.
Section 27, however, actually leaves the crucial
question unanswered.

While it governs jurisdiction over the

suits authorized by the 1934 Act, it does not define what those
suits are; in particular, it does not authorize suits by
private parties for declaratory and injunctive relief.

Nor

does any other section of the Williams Act explicitly authorize
a private party to maintain such an action.
Following the approach towards implied causes of
action that we are working on in the eannon opinion, then, I
would have to conclude that there 1s no authorization in the
Williams Act for Great Western to claim declaratory and

-----------------------------~------------------------------~Nor do I think

injunctive relief from the Idaho statute.
----------~~

the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28
to create such a claim for relief.

u.s.c.

that

§2201, should be read

The purpose of §2201 is to

allow federal causes of action otherwise maintainable in
federal court to be pursued at an earlier stage in any given
controversy, before actual damage has been sustained by the
plaintiff.

In terms of the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28

U.S.C. §2201, Great Western does not have a right to a

4.

declaration of the unconstitutionality of the Idaho statute,
because Congress has not created such a right.

The implication

of this reasoning is that under current federal law, Great
Western's Supremacy Clause claim could only be asserted as a
defense to an action against it under the Idaho statute 1n the
Idaho courts.
As I mentioned at the beginning of this memorandum,
the appellants have not raised any question reqarding the basis
for Great Western's suit.

Since no issue of jurisdiction is

implicated by the "cause of action" problem, I think that the
Court would be justified in simply noting the problem and

I

stating that the appellants have conceded any claim they might
have had on this point.

In other cases involving similar

actions for declaratory and injunctive relief against state
statutes on the ground that they conflicted with federal
statutes, the Court has proceeded directly to the pre-emption
question with no mention of the statutory basis for the
plaintiffs' suit.
(1977\;

~ones ~ v~ · Rath · Facking · eo:,

Dooqlas · v: · 8eacoast ~ Prodacts; A inc;,

430

431

u.s.

u.s.

519

265

(1977).
I do think that it would be a qood idea to indicate
the presence of the problem.

As in eannon, there is an

opportunity to point out here the need for precise analysis of
the relief that Conqress affords to various parties, at various
times during a g1ven controversy, in either federal or state
court s.
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II

The statutory language suggests three different approaches
to the jurisdictional issue. The first involves a consideration
of the words "secured by the Constitution of the United
States" as used in § 1343. The second focuses on the remedy
authorized by § 1983 and raises the question whether that
section is a statute that secures "equa.l rights" or "civil rights''
within the meaning of ~ 1343. The third approach makes the
jurisdictional issue turn on whether the Social Security Act
is a statute that secures "equal rights" or "civil rights." ·we
consider these approaches in turn.
1. The Suprenuu;y Clause
Under ~ 1343 (3), Congress has crea~federal_Lurisdict!on
of any civil action authorized by law to redress the deprivation under color of state law "of any right, privilege. or immunity secured [ 1] by the Constitution of the United States ot
[2] by an act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States." Claimants correctly point out that the first prepositional phrase ca.n be fairly read to describe rights secured by
the Supremacy Clause: For even though that Clause is not a
source of any federal rights, i't does "secure" federal rights by
according them priority whenever they come in conflict with
state law. 2 " In that sense all federal rights, whether created
clniming that. n court ha:< pow<>r to grant rrlirf in hi~ behnlf ha:< the burden
·of per::;un:;ion on tht' juri:;dictional i,-,-ue, .McNutt v. General Motonr
Acceptauce Curp., 29~ lJ. S. II~, 189, r:;peeially II' hen hr i" pro<'t>Pding in
n ronrt. of limited juri,.:diction. Tur11er, Admi11istrator , .. Hunk of Nurth
AmNi.ca. 4 DaB. 8, II.
1
~~~ "Tlw argnmrnt tlwt th<> phrn~r in the stntutt> :;t'cnrro Ly thr Con:<titution' rdrr:< to right:; 'cr<>:ltt'd,' rather than 'protectrd' b~· it, is not
·1wr,;u:1,.:ive. Tht· prramule of t hr Con"t it ut.ion, procla iminK t hr establishmrnt of t hr Con:;t it ut ion in ordt>r 1 o '"Pl'IIT!' t hr Ble,-:::ing~ of Lil.Jt'rty,' USE':"
the word '~c·rurr' in the ;;rn:o:c of 'protrct' or 'm:lkt> certain.' That. the
phr:1se w:1,; u:;(•cl in thi,- :"Pli"P in the stHt11te now under con,.;idrnltion was:
·rerognizPrl in Cartu v. Grcc11how, 114 U.S. 317, ~22, where it wa.~ hPid

77-719 &
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by treaty, by statute, or by regulation., are "secured'' by the
Suprcmar.y Clause.
In Swift & Co. v. W1:c:kltam, 382 U. S. 111, the Court was
confronted with an analogous choice between two interpretations of the statute uefining the jurisdiction of three-judge
district courts. 30 The comprehensive language of that statute.
28 U. S. C. § 2281."' could have been broadly read to encompass statutory claims secured by the Supremacy Clause or
narrowly read to exclude claims that involve no federal constitutional provision except that Clause. After acknowledg'ing that the broa.cler reading was consistent not only with the
· statutory language but also with the policy of the statute, the
)ourt accepted the more restrictive reading. I~ reasoningTs
persuasive and app 1ca le to the problems confronting us in
this case.
"This restrictive view of the application of § 2281 is more
as n maHer of plending that thn J)articuhr cause of·action set up on the
plaintiff';:; pleading wa;: in contract and was not to redre;;.~ depriv;~tion of
the 'right. secured to him by thnt clau"e of the Constitution' [the contract clause], to which hP had 'cho~cn not t.o r~ort:' See, as to other
right~ protectPd by the Con~t itufion :md lwnce f::f>cured L~· it, brought
within the pro,·ision~ of R . S. § 5508, Logan \'. Unite.d States, 144 U. S.
263; In rt' Quarles and Butlt'r, ISS U. S. 532: ['nited States v. Mosley,
238 U. S. 383." llague "· C. I. 0., 301 U. S. 496, 526-527 (opinion of
Stone, .T.).
30 TIHI three-judgr court. :-:tntutl', including thE' language at i&;ue in
Swift & Co. \'. Wickham, 382 11 . S. 11, was originally enacted in 1910,
36 SUtt. 557, at a time when the Judicial Code of 1911 wn.s under Rctive
con,;iclrra t ion.
31 When Su•ift & Co. was decided, § 2281 providrd:
"An interlocutory or permanent injunction rr.;training the enforcement,
operation or execution of any Stnt<' stntute Ly rr.straining the action of
:my officer of ~uch State in the Pnforeement or expcution of ~uch statute or
of any order madr by an admini,;trative board or commi::;,:ion acting under
State statutes, shall 110t be granted b~ · an~· district rourt or judge thereof
upon tht' ground of the uucu11slitutionality of such statute unlPs.s the application thereof i. heard :1nd dPtPnnined by a di~trict C'ourt of throe ·
judge,; under Sl'Ction 22 -l of thi:; title." (Empha:;i:; Hdded.)

•

.,-1-119 & 'ii'-5324-(WtNION

·CHAPMAN v. HOUSTON WELFARE RIGHTS ORG.

13

-consistent with a discriminating reading of the statute
itself than is the first a.nd more embracing interpretation.
The statute requires a three-judge c'o urt in order to
restrain the enforcement of a state statute 'upon the
gl'Ound of the unconstitutionality of such sta.tute.' Since
all federal actions to enjoin a state enactment r~timately o1ltl1e SUP'rei11ac- Claus~, the words 'upon the
groun o the unconstitutionality of such statute"'Wauld
· appe~= to eXcTUde
some typeS01'SU'ch mjunctive suits. For a simple provi.--~-:-:-:~
sion
prohibiting the restraint of the enforcement of any
state statute except by a three-judge court would manifestly have sufficed to embrace every such suit whatever
its particular constitutional ground. It is thus quite
permissible to read the phrase in question as one of
limitation, sigi1ifying a congressional purpose to confine
the three-judge court requirement to injunctive suits
depending directly upon a substantive provision of the
Constitution, leaving cases of conflict with a federal
statute (or treaty) to follow their normal course in 'li
single-judge court." Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S.
111, 126-127.

-

-

--- --

Just as the phrase in ~ 2281-"upon the ground of the
unconstitutionality of such stature"-would have been superfluous unless read as a limitation on three-judge court jurisdiction , so is it equally clear that the entire reference in § 1343
(3) to rights secured by au act of Congress would be unneces~ if the earlier reference to constitutional claims embraced
those res tiiig"Soiely onth e Supremacy <:'la use. M ore importantly~a dition 81 language wfiich describes a limited
category of acts of Congress- those "providing for equal rights
of citizens"-plainly nega.tes the notion that jurisdiction ovet
all statutory claims had already been conferred by the preceding reference to constitutional claims.
Thus, while· we recognize that there is force to claimants~
argument that the remedinl purpose of the civil rights leg-

77-719 & 77-5324-0PINION
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islation supports an expansive interpretation of the phrase
"secured by the Constitution," it would make little sense for
Congress to have drafted the statute as it did 1f it had
intended to co11fer jurisdiCtiOn over every conceivable federal
claim against a sta.te agent. In order to give meaning to the
entire statute as written by Congress, v;·e must conclude that
an allegation of incompatibility betwe~n federal anCI state
statutes and--regwailons does not, in itse"i.t""give rise to 1t
claim "secured by the Constitution" within . the meaning of
§ 1343
(3).-~------

-

-

2. Section 1983
Claimants next argue that the "equal rights" language of
§ 1343 (3) should not be read literaiiy or, if it is, that § 1983,
the source of their asserted cause of action, should be considered an act of Congress "providing for equal rights'' within
the meaning of § 1343 (3) or "providing for the protection of
civil rights" within § 1343 (4). In suppprt of this position,
they point t.o the common origin of §' 1983 and § 1343 (3) in
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and this Court's recognition that
the latter is the jurisdictional counterpart of the former.~ 2
Since broad language describing statutory claims was used in
both provisions during the period betw-een 1874 and 1911 and
has been retained in § 1983, ru1d since Congress in the JudiciaJ
Code of 1911 purported to be making no changes in the exist-.
·.. ing law as to jurisdiction in this a.rea, the 11 equal rights" language of § 1343 (3) must be construed to encompass all stl:ltU-·
tory claims arising under the broader la.nguage of § 1983'..
Moreover. in view of its origin in the Civil Rights Act of 1871'
and its function in modern litigation. ~ 1983 does "provid[eJ
for the protection of civil rights., within the meaning of
'§ 1343 ( 4).
~"See Lynch v. Hou sehold Fi11a11ce Corp .. 405 U. S. 538, 540, 543~
Examinino Board of Enoiueers, Architects & Surveyors v. D eOtero, 42():

'U. S. 572, 583.

-
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SUPPLEM~NTAL - MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re:

No. 78-759, Kidwell v. Great -western United

Corp~

Luther Munford, one of Justice Blackmun's clerks,
yesterday shared an interesting observation about this case with
me.

He pointed out that nowhere in the opinion of the CA 5 or

in the Briefs of the parties here has there been any discussion
of the source of Great Western United's rioht to maintain this
action in federal court -- that is, the source of its "cause of
action."

The appellee's complaint mentions the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934 and 42

u.s.c.

~1983

as the laws unner which

its claim arises.
Great Western has two bases for attackinq the validity
of the Idaho statute, the Commerce Clause and the pre-emption
claim under the Supremacy Clause and the Williams Act.
the construction of the term "Constitution" in
adopt in Chapman,

~1983

~1983

Given

that we

noes provide a cause of action for

'

.
2.

assertion of the Commerce Clause claim.

But

~19B3

does not

create a cause of action based on the contravention of the
Williams Act by the Idaho statute.

We arque in Chapman that

"laws" in §1983 includes only civil riahts laws, amonq which
Williams Act noes not number.

th~

And it would undercut this

limitation on "laws" completely if the term "Constitution" in
§1983 were construed to include Supremacy Clause claims.

On

this latter point, I refer you to Justice Stevens' discussion in
his opinion in Chapman of the comparable situation with respect
to 28

u.s.c.

~1343.

An alternative source for Great Western's cause of
action is the Williams Act itself.

But there is only a tenuous

basis for supposing that the Williams Act creates a statutory
right to be free of conflicting state laws, and even less
support for the conclusion that it authorizes private suits in
federal court to obtain declaratory and iniunctive relief from
such state laws.
The argument on the former ooint would overlap, I
suppose, with the appellee's contentions reqarding the
availability of oersonal iurisdiction under Section 27 of the
1934 Act.

This argument actually begins with Section 28 of the

1934 Act, which provioes that:
"Nothina in this chapter shall affect the
iurisdiction of the securities commission (or anv
aqencv or officer performing like functions) of any
State over anv security or any person insofar as it
does not conflict with the provisions of this
chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder."
Great Western has arqued, in connection with the question of
jurisdiction, that Section 28 by implication prohibits state

3.

laws in conflict with the federal securitjes laws.*

Granted

this premise, it might arque also that a Private cause of action
to enforce that prohibition should be implied under Section 28.
Even assuming, as the appellee urqes, that Section 28
was meant to do more than limit the pre-emptive effect of the
1934 Act, there may be no warrant for implying a private cause
of action to enforce in federal court the implieo limitation on
state laws.

It is true that under the 1934 Act, there is no

apparent provision for enforcement of that limitation by the SEC
in federal courts.

Even if that is so, I see no particular

problem with the conclusion that the pre-emptive effect of the
Williams Act is to be left for assertion as a defense to an
action by the State under the Idaho statute in the Idaho courts.
The appellee also invoked the Declaratory Judgments
Act, 28

u.s.c.

~2201,

in its complaint.

But as long as the

concepts of jurisdiction and cause of action are to be separateo
carefully, that Act cannot orovioe a cause of action for
i--G1ven thfs construction of Section 28, the appellee has
argued that enforcement of a state law inconsistent with the
Williams Act constitutes a "violation" of that Act within the
meaning of Section 27 of the 1934 Act.
"Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty
created by this chapter or rules and regulations
thereunder, or to enioin any violation of such
chapter or rules and regulations, may be brought in
any such district fwherein anv act or transaction
constitutinq the violation occurredl or in the
district wherein the oefendant is found or is an
inhabitant or transacts business •••• "
The appellee argues that since some of the acts constituting the
violation occurred in Texas, the suit properly was maintained
there.

4•
assertion of the pre-emption claim.

The purpose of

~2201

is

only to allow federal causes of action otherwise maintainable in
federal court to be pursued at an earlier staqe in any qiven
controvesy, before actual damaqe has been sustained by the
plaintiff.

In terms of the Declaratory Judgments Act, then,

Great Western does not have a riqht to a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the Idaho statute because Conqress has
not created a cause of action for such a declaration.
As I mentioned at the beginninq of this memorandum, the
appellants have not raised any question regardinq the basis for
the appellee's SuPremacy Clause-Williams Act claim.

Since no

issue of jurisdiction is implicated by the "cause of action"
problem, I think that the Court would be justified in simply
notinq the problem and statinq that the appellnnts have conceded
any claim they miqht have had on this point.

In other cases

involvinq similar actions for declaratory and iniunctive relief
against state statutes on the ground that they conflicted with
federal statutP.s, the Court has proceeded directly to the preemption question with no mention of the statutory basis for the
plaintiffs' suits.

F.;q; ,,Jones v; Rath Packinq Co;, 430 U.S. 519

(1977): Douglas v; Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
But I do think that it would be well at least to indicate the
presence of the oroblem.

As in Cannon, there is an opportunity

here to point out the need for precise analysis of the relief
that Conqress affords to various parties, at various times
during a given controversy, in either federal or state courts.
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MR. JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Idaho statute imposes restrictions on certain purchasers
·
f stock in corporations having substantial assets in Idaho.
,/j The questions presented by this appeal are whether the state
agents responsible for enforcing the statute may be required
JT{
to defend its constitutionality in a federal district court in
~xas, and if so, whether the statute conflicts with the
Williams Act amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934/ and the Commerce Clause of the United States
•
• Constitution. 2
Sunshine Mining and Metal Co. (Sunshine) is a "target
company" within the meaning of the Idaho Corporate Takeover Act--a statute designed to regulate takeovers of corporations that have certain connections to the State. 3 Sunshine's

J r

82 Stat. 454, see 15 U.S. C.§§ 78m (d)-78m (e), 77n (d)-78n (f).
·'The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the seV'eral States, and with the Indian
Tribe~ . . . . " U. S. ConRt., Art. I, § 8.
3 Chapter 15 of Title 30 of the Idaho ·code is entitled "Corporate Takeovers." Its opening provision contains the following definition:
"'Target company' means a corporation or other issuer of securitiPs
which is organized under the laws of this state or has its principal office m
1

2
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principal business is a silver mining operation in the Coeur
d'Alene Mining District in Idaho. Its executive offices and
most of its assets are located in the State. Sunshine is also
engaged in business in New York and, through a subsidiary,
in Maryland. Its stock is traded over the New York Stock
Exchange, and its shareholders are dispersed throughout the
country. App. 36. It is a Washington corporation. 439 F.
Supp. 420, 423-424.
Great Western United Corporation (Great Western) is an
"offeror" within the meaning of the Idaho statute.4 Great
Western is a publicly owned Delaware corporation with executive headquarters in Dallas, Tex., and corporate offices in
Denver, Colo. App. 131. In early 1977, Great Western decided to make a public offer to purchase 2 million shares of
Sunshine stock for a premium price. Because consummation
of the proposed tender offer would cause Great Western to
own more than 5% of Sunshine's outstanding shares, Great
Western was required to comply with certain provisions of the
Williams Act and arguably also to comply with the Idaho
this state, which has substantial assets located in this state. whosP equity
securities of any class are or have been registered under chapter 14, title 30,
Idaho Code, or predecessor laws or section 12 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and which is or may be involved in a takeover offer relating
to any class of its equity securities." Idaho Code § 30-1501 (6) (emphasis
added).
4 " 'Offeror' means a person who makes or in an~· way participates irt
making a take-over offer, and includes all affiliates and associates of that
person, and all persons acting jointly or in concert for the purpose of acquiring, holding or disposing of or exercising any voting rights attached to
the equity securities for which a take-over offer is made."
"'Take-over offer' means the offer to acquire or the acquisition of any
equity security of a target company, pursuant to a tender offer or request
or invitation for tenders, if after the acquisition thereof the offeror would
be directly or indirectly a beneficial owner of more than five per cent
(5%) of any clas~ of the outstanding equity securities of the issuer."
Idaho Code§§ 30-1501 (3), (6).

'

'
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Corporate Takeover Act as well as with similar provisions of
New York and Maryland.
On March 21 , 1977, Great Western publicly announced its
intent to make a tender offer for 2 million shares of Sunshine,
and its representatives took simultaneous steps to implement
the proposed tender offer. They filed a Schedule 13D with
the Securities Exchange Commission in Washington disclosing
the information required by the Williams Act. They consulted with state officials in Idaho, New York, and Maryland
about compliance with the corporate takeover laws of those
States. And they filed documents with the Idaho Commissioner of Finance in an attempt to satisfy Idaho's statute.
On March 25, 1957, Melvin Baptie, who was then the
Deputy Administrator of Securities of the Idaho Department
of Finance, sent a telecopy letter of objections to Great Western's filing to the company's offices in Dallas. The letter
stated that certain pages of Great Western's SEC Form 13D
were missing, asked for several additional items of information, and indicated that no hearing would be scheduled, nor
other action taken, until all of the requested information had
been received. App. to Juris. Statement, at A-156 to A-164.'
On the same day Tom McEldowney, the Director of Finance
of Idaho, entered an order delaying the effective date of the
tender offer. !d., at A-165 to A-166. Gr€at Western made
no response to Baptie's letter or to McEldowney's order.
On March 28, 1977, Great Western filed this action in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, naming as defendants the sta.te officials responsible for
enforcing the Idaho, New York, and Maryland takeover laws.
The complaint prayed for a declaration that the state laws
were invalid insofar as they purported to apply to interstate
cash tender offers to purchase securities traded on the national
exchange. App., at 1-36. The cla.ims against the Maryland
and New York defendants were dismissed because the former
-did not attempt to enforce their statute against Great Western

78-759-0PINION
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and the latter expressly stated that they would not assert
jurisdiction over the proposed tender offer. 439 F. Supp., at
428-429. The two Idaho defendants-McEldowney, the Di~
rector of Finance, and Wayne Kidwell, then Attorney General
of the State "-appeared specially to contest 'jurisdiction
venue, and the merits of the claim.
The District Court found four separate statutory bases for
federal jurisdiction.n It held that personal jurisdiction over
the Idaho defendants had been obtained by service pursuant
to the Texas longarm statute. 7 It concluded, however, that
venue was improper under the general federal venue statute,
28 U. S. C. § 1391 (b) ,8 because the defendants obviously did
not reside in Texas and the claim arose in Idaho rather than in
Texas. Nonetheless, it decided that venue could be sustained
under the special venue provision in § 27 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act). 15 U. S. C. §§ 78aa.
See nn. 9 and 10, infra, and accompanying text.
On the merits, the District Court held that the Idaho Takeover Act is pre-empted by the Williams Act and places an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce. It granted in~
junctive relief that enabled Great Western to acquire the desired Sunshine shares in the Fall of 1977. 439 F. Supp., at
434-440. That acquisition did not moot the case, however,
Baptie, who wrote the letter of comment on March 25, 1977, wa.;; not
named as a defendant. David H. Leroy has now replaced Kidwell as
Attorney General of the Gtate.
c; "The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case on four
bases: 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (general federal question), 28 U. S. C. § 1332
(diversity), 28 U. S. C. § 1337 (acts affecting commerce) and Section 27
of the [Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78aa] ." 439 F .
Supp., at 430.
7 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat., art. 2031.
8 Section 1391 (b) provides:
" [C]ivil actions in which jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity
of citizenship may be brought in the judicial district 'where all defendants
reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.',.
5
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"because the question whether Great Western has violated
Idaho's statute will remain open unless and until the District
Court's judgment is finally affirmed.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court sustained federal subject matter
jurisdiction on the same four grounds relied upon by the District Court. See n. 6, supra. It then advanced alternate
theories in support of both its determination that the District
Court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants and its
conclusion that venue lay in the Northern District of Texas.
First, it noted that the Texas longarm statute authorized the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the
fullest extent allowable under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It then held that an Idaho official
who seeks to enforce an Idaho statute to prevent a Texasbased corporation from proceeding with a national tender offer
has SPfficient contacts with Texas to support jurisdiction.
Second, it held that jurisdiction was available under § 27 of
the 1934 Act, 9 which gives the federal district courts exclusive
jurisdiction over suits brought "to enforce any ... duty
created" by the Act. It based this holding on the theory that
Idaho's enforcement attempts, by conflicting with the William~ Act, constituted a violation of a "duty" impoEed by
9

"The district courts of tho United States, ... shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity or actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder. Any criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein
any act or transaction constituting the violation oecurred. Any suit or
action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or rules
and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such chapter
or rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the
district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts
business, and process in such catieS may be served in any other district of
which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be
'found . . .. " 15 U.S. C.§ 78aa.
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It relied on the same reasoning to sup.
port its conclusion that venue was authorized by § 27 of the
1934 Act. Finally, disagreeing with the District Court, the
Court of Appeals concluded that venue in the Northern District of Texas was also proper under the general federal venue
provision, 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (b), because the allegedly invalid
restraint against Great Western occurred there and it was
accordingly "the judicial district ... in which the claim
arose." 577 F. 2d, at 1265-1274. On the merits, the Court
of Appeals agreed with the analysis of the District Court.
/d., at 1274-1296.
We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal. - U. S. -.
Without reaching either the merits or the constitutional question arising out of the attempt to assert personal jurisdiction
over appellants, we now reverse because venue did not lie in
the Northern District of Texas.
§ 28 (a) of the Act. 10

I
The question of personal jurisdiction, which goes to the
court's power to exercise control over the parties, is typically
decided in advance of venue, which is primarily a matter of
choosing a convenient forum. See generally Wright, Miller &
Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3801. at 5-6 (1976).
On the other hand, neither personal jurisdiction nor venue is
fundamentally preliminary in the sense that subject matter
jurisdiction is, for both are personal privileges of the defendant, rather than absolute strictures on the court, and both may'
be waived by the parties. See Olberding v. Illinois Central R.
Co., 346 U. S. 338, 340; Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308
U. S. 165, 167-168. Accordingly, when there is a sound pru10 Section 28 provides, in pertinent. part:
"Nothing in this chapter shall affect the juri:sdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or officer pprforming like functions) of any State
over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the
provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." 1&

u.s. c.§78bb.
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dential justification for doing so, we conclude that a court may
reverse the normal order of considering personal jurisdiction
and venue.
Such a justification exists in this case. Although for the
reasons discussed in Part II, infra, it is clear that § 27 of the
1934 Act does not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction, the
question whether personal jurisdiction was properly obtained
pursuant to the Texas longarm statute is more difficult. In~
deed, because the Texas Supreme Court has construed its
statute as authorizing the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted by the United States
Constitution,n resolution of this question would require the
Court to decide a question of constitutional law that it has
not heretofore decided. As a prudential matter it is our practice to avoid the unnecessary decision of novel constitutional
questions. We find it appropriate to pretermit the constitutional issue in this case because it is so clear tha.t venue was
improper under either § 27 of the 1934 Act or under § 1391 (b)
of the Judicial Code.
II
The linchpin of Great Western's argument that venue is
provided by § 27 of the 1934 Act is its interpretation of
§ 28 (a) of that Act. See nn. 9-10, supra. It reads § 28 as
imposing an affirmative "duty" on the State of Idaho, the
violation of which may be redressed in the federal courts
under § 27. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said of a similar
E. g., U-Achor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S. W. 2d 760 (Tex. 1977) .
Appellants argue that this construction is only applicable to private commercial defendants and should not govern either in a suit against the
agents of another sovereign state or in one against persons who are not
engaged in commercial endeavors. Both the District Court and the Court
of Appeals , however, have concluded that the statute does extend to the
limits of the Due Process Clau~e in this case, and it is not our practice·
to re-examine state-law determinations of this kind. E. g., Butner v.
United States, - U. S.-, - ; Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, ~45-346, ,
and n. 8; Pmpper v. Clark, 337 U . S. 472, 486-487.
11

"78-759-0PINION
8

LEROY v. GREAT WESTERN UNITED CORP.

argument in a similar case, however, "[t]his is a horse soon
curried." Olberding, supra, 346 U. S., at 340.
The reference in § 27 to the "liabilit[ies] or dut[ies] created
by this chapter" clearly corresponds to the various provisions
in the 1934 Act that explicitly establish duties for certain participants in the securities market or that subject such persons
to possible actions brought by the Government, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, or private litigants.u Section 28
is not such a provision. There is nothing in its text or its
legislative history to suggest that it imposes any duty on the
States or that indicates who might enforce any such duty.
The section was plainly intended to protect, rather than to
limit, state authority. 1 a Because ~ 28 imposed no duty on
petitioner, the argument that § 27 establishes venue in the
District Court is unsupportable.
12
E. g., § 14 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78n (a) ("It shall be
unlawful for any person ... to solicit ... any proxy ... in contravention
of such rules as the Commission may prescribe .... ") (emphasis added);
id., § 16 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b) ("For the purpose of preventing the
unfair use of information which may have been obtained by [the] beneficial owner [of 10% of any class of equity security], director, or officer by
reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from
any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equitr security of
such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less
than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable
by the iss.uer . . . ." (Emphasis added); id., § 17 (a)(1), 15 U.S. C.
§ 78q (a) (1). ("Every national securities exchange, every member thereof,
every broker or dealer who transacts a business in securities through the
medium of any such member, every registered securities association, and
every broker or dealer registered pursuant to [15 U. S. C. § 7861 shall
make, keep, and . preserve . . . such accounts . . . and make such reports . . . as the Commission by its rules and regulations may prescribe .... ") (emphasis added).
18 Thomas Corcoran, a principal draftsman of the 1934 Act, indicated
to Congress that the purpose of § 28 was to leave the States with as much
leeway to regulate securities transactions as the Supremacy Clau e would
~llow them in the absen~e of such a provision. Senate Committee on ·
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select an unfair or inconvenient place of triaP 5 For that
reason, Congress has generally not made the residence of the
plaintiff a oasis for venue in nondiversity cases. But cf. 28
U. S. C. § 1391 (e). The desirability of consolidating similar
claims in a single proceeding may lead defendants, such perhaps as the New York and Maryland officials in this case, to
waive valid objections to otherwise improper venue. But
that concern does not justify reading the statute to give the
plaintiff the right to select the place of trial that best suits his
convenience. So long as the plain language of the statute
does not open the severe type of "venue gap" that the amendment giving plaintiffs the right to proceed in the district where
the claim arose was designed to close,16 there is no reason to
read it more broadly on behalf of plaintiffs. 17
Moreover, the plain language of § 1391 (b) will not bear
the Court of Appeals' interpretation. The statute allows
venue in "the judicial district ... in which the claim arose."
Without deciding whether this language adopts the occasionally fictive assumption that a claim may arise in only one
district, 18 it is absolutely clear that Congress did not intend to
See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U. S. 484, 493-494;
Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, :387
U. S. 556, 560 ; Nierbo, supra, 308 U. S., at 168; Reuben H. Donnelley
Corp. v. F'l'C, 580 F. 2d 264, 269 (CA7 1978),
16 See Brunette Machine Works v. Kokum lndust1·ies, 406 U. S. 706,
710, and n. 8. As Brunette indicates, the amendment of § 1391 to provide
for venue where the claim aro~c wa:; designrd to close the "venue gap"
that exi;;ted under earlier vrrsionR of tlw stntutr in situntionH in which
joint tortfeasors, or other multiple defendant1> who contributed to a single
injurious act, could not be sued jointly because they resided in different
d ' -tricts. !d., at 710 n. 8. In this case, by contrast, Great Western has
attempted to join in one suit three srparat.e claims-each challenging a
different statute--aga,inst three sets of drfcndant8 from threr States. The
statute simply dces not contemplntr such a choice on thr part of plaintiffs.
17 "The requirement of venue is SJJf'Cific and unambiguous; it. is not one
of those vague principles which, in the interest of some overriding policy,
is to be given a 'liberal' construction." Olberding, supra, 346 U. S., at 340.
' 8 The two sides of this question, and the cn.,;es supporting each, are
16
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provide for venue at the residence of the plaintiff or to give
that party an unfettered choice among a host of different districts. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556,
560. Rather, it restricted venue either to the residence of the
defendants or to "a place which may be more convenient to
the litigants"-i. e. , both of them-"or to the witnesses who
are to testify in the case." S. Rep. No. 1752, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1963). See Denver & R. G. W., supra, at 560. See also
Brunette Machine Works v. Kokum Industries, 406 U.S. 706,
710. In our view, therefore, the broadest interpretation of
the language of § 1391 (b) tha.t is even arguably acceptable is
that in the unusual case in which it is not clear that the claim
arose in only one specific district/ 0 a plaintiff may choose between those two (or conceivably even more) districts that
with approximately equal plausibility- in terms of the availability of witnesses, the accessibility of other relevant evidence, and the convenience of the defendant (but not of the
plaintiff)- may be assigned as the locus of the claim. Cf.
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U. S. 484, 493-494.
This case, is not, however, unusual. For the claim involved
has only one obvious locus-the District of Idaho. Most importantly, it is action that was taken in Idaho by Idaho residents-the enactment of the statute by the legislature, the
review of Great Western's filing and the forwarding of the
comment letter by Deputy Administrator Baptie, and the
entry of the order postponing the effective date of the tender
by Finance Director McEldowney-as well as the future action that may be taken in the State by its officials to punish
or to remedy any violation of its law, that provide the basis
for Great Western 's federal claim. For this reason, the bulk
of the relevant evidence and witnesses-apart from employees
discussed in 1 J. Moore, supra, ~ 0.142 [5.-2] , at 1426-1435 ; Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 3806 , at 28-34.
19
See ALI, Study of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts,
Commentary to Proposed Final Draft, at 80-81 (1965) .
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of the plaintiff, and securities experts who come from all over
the United States ~ -is also located in the State Less important, but nonetheless relevant, the nature of this action challenging the constitutionality of a state statute makes venue in
the District of Idaho appropriate. The merits of Great Western's claims may well depend on a proper interpretation of the
State's statute, and federal judges sitting in Idaho are better
qualified to construe Idaho law, and to assess the character of
Idaho's probable enforcement of that law, than are · judges
sitting elsewhere. See cases cited in n. 11, supra.
We therefore reject the Court of Appeals' reasoning that
the "claim arose" in Dallas because that is where Great Western proposed to initiate its tender offer, and that is where
Idaho's statute had its impact on Great Western. Aside from
the fact that these "contacts" between the "claim" and the
Texas district fall far short of those connecting the claim and
the Idaho district, we note that this reasoning would subject
the Idaho officials to suit in almost every district in the country. For every prospective offeree-be he in New York, Los
Angeles, Miami, or elsewhere, rather than in Dallas-could
argue with equal force (or Great Western could argue on his
behalf) that he had intended to direct his local broker to
accept the tender and was frustrated in that desire by the
Idaho law. 21 As we noted above. however, sucp a reading of
§ 1391 (b) is inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the
0

20 At the trial held in the Northern District of Texas, the witness roHter,
in addition to various Idaho officials and Great Western employees from
Dallas, mainly included experts from the New York area as well as one
each from California, Maryland, Texas, and Wisconsin. App., at 100-292.
21
Sunshine's shareholders are located in 49 States as well a~:> the Di~:>tl'ict
of Columbia and Puerto Rico. App., at 36.
22
In De-nver & R. G. W., the Court concluded that the drafters of
§ 1391 (b) did not intend to provide venue in suits against unincorporated
associations in every district in which a member of the association resided.
To do so, it noted would give the plaintiff an unrestrained choice of
venues and would accordingly be "patently unfair" to the defendant. 387
U. S., at 560. A like reasoning is controlling here.
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provision, for it would leave the venue decision entirely in the
hands of plaintiffs, rather than making it "primarily a matter
of the convenience of litigants and witnesses." Denver &
R. G. W., supra, 387 U. S., at 560. 22 In short, the District of
Idaho is the only one in which "the claim arose" within the
meaning of § 1391 (b).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
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CH AM BERS OF

J

JUSTICE J OHN PAUL STEVENS

May 22, 1979

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re:

78-759 - Leroy v. Great Western
United Corporation

Although I realize that a majority of the
Court was prepared to reverse on the ground that
there was no personal jurisdiction in Texas over
the Idaho official, I am hopeful that you may
find my reliance on the Ctear absence of proper
venue ac~taQle.
I did have some diff1cu!EY
w1th the implications of a jurisdictional holding
and believe it is proper to avoid that constitutional
question when a simple statutory answer is available.
I try to justify this approach in Part I on pages
6 and 7.
Respectfully,

)L_

~nprtme

<!:onrt l,f tltc~tnitd~ $>tah•s
'Jillagftinl1t~,tt, ~. <!J. 2!l,?J~;l ·

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

May 23, 1979

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Due to a mix-up, an earlier memorandum
circulated today advised that I was considering a
dissent in No. 78-1060, Great Western Sugar Co.
Vo

Edward L. Nelson.

In fact, the case is

No. 78-759, Leroy v. Great Western United Corporation.
Please substitute the attached corrected memorandum
for the earlier one.
Sincerely,

~u.vumt

<qctt.tt Gf ttrt :p-ttittb .§~aUg

~ailfrhtgi(Jlt, ~.

<q.

20pJt.~

·

<:HAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHIT E

May 23, 1979

Re:

No. 78-759 -- Leroy v. Great Western
United Corporation

Dear John:
I am considering a dissent in this

case.
Sincerely,

,4',tl.J t' :4.L.

B.R.W.
Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

May 26, 1979

78-759 Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.

Dear John:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

i'u:prttttt <!fourllli t!tt ~.tb i'taf;tg
jirulfingt~ ~·

<!f.
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CHAMBERS OF

/

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 29, 1979

Re:

No. 78-759 - Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.

Dear John:
Please join me.
sincerely,r

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

-

BB

6/7/79

MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re:

No. 78-759,

Leroy · v~ · Great · western

United Corp.

I have reviewed Justice White's dissent, and recommend
that you stay with Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court.
Justice White accepts at least two arguments that you have
considered and rejected.

First, he concludes that some part of

the alleged "violation" by the Idaho officials occurred in
Texas.

Second, he decides that the activities of the Idaho

officials in enforcing their statute amounts to a "violation" of
the Williams Act (within the meaning of

§

27 of that Act) if the

state statute has been preempted by the federal law.

'

'

2.
I also call to your attention Section II of Justice
White's opinion, because it contains a pernicious idea that
should be guarded against in the future.

He states that there

are "no restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the exercise
of jurisdiction by the United States over its residents."

This

argument has been advanced by the SG in recent cases, including
this one, so it probably will reappear in the future.

As I

understand the argument, it amounts to the assertion that so far
as the Due Process Clause is concerned, any federal court may
acquire personal jurisdiction over any resident of the United
States, so long as service of process is sufficient to qive the
notice required by the Constitution and to meet whatever
statutory requirements may be applicable.
This seems to me to be totally at odds with the kind of
fairness analysis adopted in International - Shoe.

Suppose, for

example, that the federal securities laws provided that a suit
under those statutes could be maintained in any federal court,
and that service of process could be made anywhere in country.
Under the statutes, it would be possible for a New York investor
defrauded by a New York broker to brinq suit in Montana, and
secure personal iurisdiction for the federal court in Montana,
by serving process on the defendant in New York.

I suqqest that

such personal iurisdiction would be in contravention of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

BB

4/24/79

MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re:

No. 78-759, Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.

I recommend that you join Justice Stevens opinion for
the Court.

His preference for deciding the case on venue

grounds is explained and justified in Section I of his opinion,
beginning on p. 6.

I think that his arguments there are

convincing.
In Section II of the opinion, Justice Stevens makes
short work of the claim that venue (and, by implication,
personal jurisdiction) are proper under § 27 of the 1934 Act.
We have discussed these arguments before, and I think that
Justice Stevens reaches the correct resolution.

2.

Section III is obviously the difficult section of the
opinion.

In it, Justice Stevens presents his reasons for

concluding that Great Western United's claim arose in Idaho
rather than Texas within the meaning of the general venue
statute.

He gives the following reasons:

In general, statutory

---

restrictions on venue are meant to protect defendants from
----~'-'~

having to defend in courts that have personal jurisdiction but
in which defense of the lawsuit would be unfair or inconvenient.
This purpose is evident from the failure to specify the
residence of the plaintiff as a basis for venue except in a few
limited types of actions.

Construing the statutory allowance

for venue in the district where the claim arises, with this
general purpose in mind, indicates that in a case such as this
one, the claim should be considered to have arisen in Idaho.
See pp. 11-12 of Justice Stevens' opinion.
The dissent is likely to raise two objections to
Justice Stevens argument in Section III.

First, it will argue

that because the actions of the Idaho officials had an impact on
Great Western in its activities in Texas, the claim of Great
Western should be considered to have arisen there.

Justice

Stevens has said about all there is to say on this point at p.
12 of his opinion.

I would describe his approach to this

argument as a balancing of relative convenience, with the scale
tipped at the outset towards the interests of the defendants

3.

because of the general statutory policy of protecting defendants
from unfair or inconvenient venue.
The dissent will probably argue, second, that Justice
Steven has created a so-called venue gap of the sort that recent
amendments to§ 1391 were meant to eliminate.

Before these

amendments, venue under§ 1391(b) was proper only in a district
in which all of the defendants resided.

Because in situations

of multiple defendants this often made venue with respect to all
defendants improper in every district, the statute was amended
to provide also for jurisdiction in the district where the claim
arose.

The dissent will argue that by taking the position he

has, Justice Stevens has created a comparable venue gap by
forcing plaintiffs such as Great Western to sue each state with
a takeover statute in the federal district court in that state.
My own view is that this is a red herring.

Great

Western and other corporations in a similar situation do not
have a single cause of action against multiple defendants.
Rather, they have separate claims arising out of each State's
corporate takeover statute.

Each claim may be pursued in a

separate action, since each presumably will raise unique
questions because of the particular provisions of the state
statute at issue.
Justice Stewart has joined Justice Stevens' opinion;
Justice White has indicated his plan to file a dissenting

opinion.
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No. 78-759
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Junell,l979

.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN, .JR.

RE:

aJ.

/

Leroy v. Great Western United Corporation

Dear Byron:
Please join me in the dissent you have prepared in the
above.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

June 12, 1979

j
.I
l

I
I

Re:

No. 78-759 - Leroy v. Great Western United
Corporation

Dear John:
Although my first preference was to decide the case
on the personal jurisdiction issue, the route you have
chosen is acceptable. My vote will ~ive you a Court,
and I therefore join your opinion.
Sincerely,

j~a£

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

~~~:e'J&U' "fUUT~

DT Uf~ ~l)' ~UUt.iJ

~asqingbtn. ~. ~· 20~'!~
CHAMBI!:RS

o..-

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 12, 1979

Dear John:
Re:

78-759 Leroy v. Great Western

I am satisfied to dispose of this case on
venue grounds.

I am equally satisfied that Texas

had no jurisdiction.
I join.

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 21, 1979

Re;

No. 7 8..- 7 59 .,.. Leroy v. · Great Western United Corp.

Dear Byron;
Please join me.
Sincerely,

I. .111.
T.M.

Mr. Justice White
cc:

The Conference
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